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Abstract
Functional explanations of behaviour often propose optimal strategies for organisms to follow. These ‘best’ strategies could
be difficult to perform given biological constraints such as neural architecture and physiological constraints. Instead, simple
heuristics or ‘rules-of-thumb’ that approximate these optimal strategies may instead be performed. From a modelling
perspective, rules-of-thumb are also useful tools for considering how group behaviour is shaped by the behaviours of
individuals. Using simple rules-of-thumb reduces the complexity of these models, but care needs to be taken to use rules
that are biologically relevant. Here, we investigate the similarity between the outputs of a two-player dynamic foraging
game (which generated optimal but complex solutions) and a computational simulation of the behaviours of the two
members of a foraging pair, who instead followed a rule-of-thumb approximation of the game’s output. The original game
generated complex results, and we demonstrate here that the simulations following the much-simplified rules-of-thumb
also generate complex results, suggesting that the rule-of-thumb was sufficient to make some of the model outcomes
unpredictable. There was some agreement between both modelling techniques, but some differences arose – particularly
when pair members were not identical in how they gained and lost energy. We argue that exploring how rules-of-thumb
perform in comparison to their optimal counterparts is an important exercise for biologically validating the output of agent-
based models of group behaviour.
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Introduction
Animals can gain many benefits from living in groups [1,2],
such as an enhanced ability to find food [3,4], avoid predation [5–
8], or make accurate decisions [9–13]. However, group living
brings costs too, such as enhancing the risks of parasitism and
infection [14,15], increasing competition for resources [4], or
increasing detectability of the group to predators [16,17]. In order
to understand why individuals of a particular species behave the
way they do when they are in a group involves understanding how
these costs and benefits are traded off against each other. If we are
interested in exploring the group behaviour of species using a
modelling framework, we therefore need to be careful to reflect
those trade-offs that are the most important within the model.
Models of social behaviour typically attempt either to identify
behaviours for a given set of environmental or social conditions, or
else simulate the behaviour of the individuals within the group to
explore how the group behaviour changes in response to
parameter manipulation. In the former approach, it is assumed
that the behaviours that will be shown by individuals are optimal
(maximising some measure of fitness), by considering these
behaviours from a functional perspective [18–20]. In contrast, a
simulation approach may incorporate an individual’s presumed
rule-set within a group simulation, and explore how changing
these rule-sets affect the behaviour of the group (e.g. [13,21–25],
where the rules used can come from careful characterisation of
biological systems, e.g. [26–29]). These two approaches explore
social behaviour from two different perspectives. The former
approach explores social behaviour from one direction, where the
best behaviour of an individual is calculated in response to the
environment and the group. The latter explores the phenomenon
from the opposite direction, and considers how individual
behaviours lead to behaviours at the level of the group. Although
complementary, many studies focus solely on one or other of these
approaches. Using the two together may lead to a deeper
understanding of a given system’s behaviour and evolution
[30,31].
In a series of models examining social foraging behaviour that
combined both approaches, Rands et al. firstly constructed a
dynamic game which identified optimal rule-sets for a pair of
foragers, based upon a trade-off between energetic intake and
predation risk when foraging alone or together [30,32]. Simplified
variations on the optimal rule-sets from these models were then
adapted to be used within individual-based simulations exploring
group behaviour [33,34]. Simplified ‘rule-of-thumb’ versions of
the rules were necessary, not only because the original optimal
rule-sets were only derived for a pair of animals foraging together,
but also because the optimal rules generated by the dynamic
games were not necessarily simple to describe, although their
salient features could broadly be approximated to a rule-of-thumb
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 July 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 7 | e22104[30,32]. In a thorough exploration of the dynamic game [30], it
was demonstrated that changes in the overall behaviours and
energetic gains by individual group members weren’t necessarily
predictable relative to changes in the initial parameters of the
system. This suggests that there may be a confounding relationship
between the finer, non-predictable components of the optimal
rule-sets and the outputs of these models. These unpredictable
relationships might be removed if simpler, rule-of-thumb approx-
imations of the optimal rule-sets are followed, such as those
explored in [33,34]. Here, we therefore run some very simple
individual-based simulations where pairs of individuals follow the
type of rule-of-thumb described by Rands et al. [30,32], to explore
whether the level of complexity seen in [30] is due to the finer
details of the true optimal rule-sets, or whether a much simpler
rule-set will generate a similar level of complexity in the behaviour
of a foraging pair.
Methods
Model outline
Each simulation followed the changes in state of a pair of
individuals over a series of consecutive periods of time. The state of
an individual i at time t was characterised by xi(t), a level of energy
reserves which could fall anywhere between 0 and xmax. At the
beginning of a period, an individual i could choose to either forage
or rest, based upon its energetic reserves. If it RESTED, it was
assumed to use energy such that at time t+1 its state was reduced
by a randomly selected amount kt drawn from a normal
distribution with mean loss ki and standard deviation si (bounded
such that if any random loss generated was less than zero, a zero
value was returned). If it FORAGED, it also incurred a loss kt with
mean ki and standard deviation si, but then increased its state by a
randomly selected amount gt drawn from a normal distribution
with mean gain ci and standard deviation ri (again, where any
randomly generated gain less than zero was reported as a zero
value). In summary, if an individual with state xi(t) at time t rested,
its state at time (t+1) was xi(t) 2 kt. If it foraged, its state at time t+1
was xi(t) 2 kt+gt.
However, if xi(t+1) fell at or below 0, the individual was assumed
to have starved, and its state remained at 0 for all subsequent
periods. If foraging pushed the individual’s state above xmax, it was
assumed that xi(t+1)=xmax.
At each timestep, the behaviour of each individual was
determined by a rule-of-thumb that depended upon the value of
its own state and that of its colleague (sketched in Figure 1).
Following the rule-set described proposed by Rands et al. [30,32],
each individual i had a switchpoint si, bounded between 0 and xmax.
If its state at time t fell below this switchpoint, it foraged during the
period (in order to avoid starvation). If its state at time t fell at or
above this switchpoint, it rested unless its colleague j was foraging
(determined by whether the colleague’s state xj(t) was below the
colleague’s switchpoint sj), in which case individual i foraged.
Therefore, the actions of the pair were determined by the individual
that was most at risk of starvation [32]. If an individual’s colleague
had starved, it foraged if its reserves fell below si, and rested
otherwise. Summary statistics were collected as described below.
As well as considering pairs of individuals following behavioural
rules that paid attention to the state of each other at a given
moment in time (referred to as a ‘paired’ rule), a set of
simulations with identical parameters to the above were
conducted, but where both individuals within a pair followed a
‘solo’ rule. Here, they foraged if their reserves fell below their own
switchpoint, and rested otherwise (identical to the rule described
above if an individual’s colleague had starved).
Parameterising identical pair members
For the cases where both pair members were considered to be
identical in their metabolic requirements and expenditures, model
exploration was conducted by generating 5,000 randomised sets of
the five parameters, where parameters were randomly drawn from
the following ranges: ci: [0, 3]; ri: [0,2]; ki: [0, ci]; si: [0, 2]; and si:
[0, xmax] (assuming that xmax=100 for both members of a pair).
Holding the other four parameters constant, each parameter in
turn was systematically altered in 24 equal steps across the
following ranges (which doubled the ranges that fixed parameters
were drawn from): ci: [1/4, 6]; ri: [1/6,4]; ki:[ ci/12, 2ci]; si: [1/
6, 4]; and si: [4, 96]. A full set of simulations was run for each of
the 24 alterations. Each set of simulations followed 10,000 pairs of
individuals over 2,500 timesteps, where each individual was
independently allocated a state drawn for a uniform distribution
between 0 and xmax at the first timestep.
Parameterising non-identical pair members
For the cases where differences were considered between the
members of a pair, the five parameters used by individual A were
first randomly drawn from similar ranges to above, using: ca: [0,
3]; ra: [0,2]; ka: [0, ca]; sa: [0, 2]; and sa: [0, xmax]. The parameters
for individual B were assumed to be identical to those of individual
A, apart from one single parameter which was systematically
altered in 24 steps over the following ranges: cb:[ ca/24, ca]; rb:
[ra/24, ra]; kb:[ ka/24, ka]; sb:[ sa/24, sa]; and sb:[ sa/24, sa].
During the systematic alteration of each single parameter, the
other four parameters were held constant, and 5,000 sets of
constant parameters were considered. Again, each set of
simulations followed 10,000 pairs of individuals over 2,500
timesteps, where each individual was independently allocated a
state drawn for a uniform distribution between 0 and xmax at the
first timestep.
Data collected
The proportion of simulations where both members of the pair
survived was recorded. If both pair members survived through to
the end of a simulation, the mean difference in energy reserves was
calculated by taking the mean absolute difference in energy
reserves between the pair members across all 2,500 of the
timesteps simulated. From these pair means, a population mean
difference in state was then calculated. Similarly, the identity of the
individual within a surviving pair that was heaviest was tracked
throughout the 2,500 steps of the simulation, and the number of
times that the identity changed was calculated. The mean number
of times that switching occurred was calculated across all the
surviving pairs for each set of simulations.
Using these criteria, the proportion of pairs surviving, the mean
energetic differences within the pairs, and the mean number of
switches in heaviness were calculated for pairs following the
‘paired’ behavioural rule and the ‘solo’ behavioural rule. Also, the
number of times each individual foraged or rested, and the
number of times the pairs foraged together, rested alone, or
conducted differing behaviours was calculated, and the proportion
of the time they were doing the same thing (their ‘synchronisation’)
was also recorded.
All simulations were conducted using code written to double-
point precision within C++. Output data were visualised using R
2.11.1 [35], with the aid of R Commander 1.5–6 [36].
Comparison to earlier results
Although very similar in final output to the current
exploration, the dynamic game described in detail by Rands
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simulations. Rather than an overall metabolic cost regardless of
activity which was countered by energetic gain when foraging (as
assumed in the current model), the dynamic game considered
potentially different metabolic costs of foraging and of resting, in
addition to the energetic gain whilst foraging. The model
presented here therefore uses a simplification of the costs outlined
in the dynamic game. The energetic cost framed here should be
directly compared to the resting cost framed in [30]: the foraging
cost in the dynamic game has no direct comparison, as this has
been absorbed into the net gain that occurs in the current model.
The switchpoint considered here was not considered in [30]. In
the game results, synchronisation was calculated differently to the
way it was quantified here, and so the results presented here are
compared with the changes in the C and S statistics of
synchronisation initially proposed in [37], that were used to
characterise synchronisation in the dynamic game (and were
argued to be more accurate than the ‘synchronisation’ coefficient
D9 that was also presented in [30]).
Note that the results reported in [30]’s Table 2 that are repeated
here may not appear identical to those in the original version, as
trends were calculated in a different manner. To correct for this,
the following changes were made. For the non-identical results
concerning energetic gain, ‘player one’ in [30] corresponds to the
current individual B, whilst for the non-identical results concern-
ing energetic loss, ‘player one’ in [30] corresponds to the current
individual A. Furthermore, the results presented for energetic gain
in [30] represents what happens when the difference in parameter
values between the pair members is increased (rather than
decreased, as discussed here), and therefore the trends for
energetic gain described in [30] have been reversed for their
presentation here.
Results
Tables 1 and 2 describe the trends for all the parameter
manipulations examined. Figures illustrating these trends are given
in the Supporting Information.
Identical pair-members
Pair survival was very predictable according to parameter
manipulation for both paired and solo foragers: increasing gain
or the range of gain seen enhanced survival, and increasing costs
led to a fall in survival. Increasing the switchpoint had a similar
effect to increasing gain, as the baseline energy reserves of the
pair was moved further and further away from the point of
starvation. Although the paired individuals were always the
most likely to survive (because their behaviour was driving them
to avoid starvation by putting on extra reserves), the exact
difference in survival between paired and solo individuals
modelled using the same parameters did not show a simple
increase or decrease, but was largely similar between the two
behavioural types (see Figure S1).
The amount of switching in reserves from heaviest to lightest
between behaviours was less predictable, with distinct intermediate
minima or maxima being seen for both mean gain and mean cost,
but increasing the variation of these terms had some effect on
switching between heaviest and lightest (Table 1, Figure S2).
Increasing the behavioural switchpoint caused paired individuals
to increase the number of times they swapped over, but reduced
the times that solo individuals changed. In all cases, it was the solo
individuals that swapped their position more often, which makes
sense – both individuals should be near their behavioural
switchpoint most of the time, and should therefore swap more
often than if one individual is heavier than the other. For further
discussion, see [30,32]. Similarly, the mean difference in the
energy reserves between the pair members tended to be
unpredictable (Table 1, Figure S3), in contrast to the clear trends
given by the game predictions in [30]. Switching behaviours also
showed similarly indistinct trends, in contrast to the results from
[30] (Table 1, Figure S4).
The actual behaviours shown by individuals showed similar
trends to [30], with a distinct reduction in time spent foraging if
gain (or variance in gain) fell, and a distinct increase in foraging if
energy expenditure or its variance increased (Table 2, Figure S5).
Increasing the switchpoint value led to an increase in foraging
behaviour as well. Paired individuals tended to forage slightly
Figure 1. Sketch of an individual’s rule set. This is the rule set used by an individual when paying attention to both its own state, and that of its
neighbour.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022104.g001
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in Figure S5), again being driven by either their own or their
colleague’s proximity to the switchpoint value.
The proportions of times individuals foraged together or
rested together showed similar trends to what individuals tended
to be doing, and this is reflected in the synchrony changes of
paired individuals, but not in the synchrony changes of
individuals following solo rules (Table 2, Figure S6). It may
therefore seem unusual that the asynchronous activities shown
by paired individuals followed any sort of trend, but there were
changes that echoed those of the proportion of times pairs
foraged together (Table 2, Figure S7). Solo individuals again
didn’t coordinate their activities, and therefore didn’t show any
predictable trends. In general, the paired behaviours of
individuals in this simulation followed the game results given
in [30].
Table 1. Effects of model parameters on measures of identical and non-identical foraging pairs.
IDENTICAL FORAGERS NON-IDENTICAL FORAGERS
direction of change in property
in response to increase in:
comparative
results
from [30]
direction of change in
property in response to increase in:
comparative
results from
[30]
gain cost gain cost
PROPERTY mean s.d. mean s.d. switchpoint gain cost mean s.d. mean s.d. switchpoint gain cost
proportion of population
where both members of
a pair are alive after 2,500
timesteps (see also
Figure S1)
using ‘paired’ rule qq qq QQ QQ qq qq qq QQ Q qq
using ‘solo’ rule qq qq QQ QQ qq qq qq QQ Q qq
larger value pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair
mean number of times
pair members switch
between being lightest and
heaviest (see also Figure S2)
using ‘paired’ rule >> qq >> qq qq q q qq qq <<
using ‘solo’ rule >> QQ >> >> QQ qq QQ >> > qq
larger value solo solo solo solo solo solo solo solo solo shift
mean difference in energetic
reserves between pair members
throughout simulation
(see also Figure S3)
using ‘paired’ rule QQ 6 << q >> QQ qq >> > QQ Q >> 6 Q
using ‘solo’ rule << 6 << qq << > 6 << < QQ
larger value pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair shift
mean number of times
player A switches
behaviour
(see also Figure S4a)
using ‘paired’ rule >> QQ >> QQ << QQ qq 6 QQ q 66 6 Q
using ‘solo’ rule >> QQ >> QQ QQ >> QQ 66 >>
larger value pair pair shift pair pair shift pair pair pair pair
mean number of times
player B switches
behaviour (see also Figure S4b)
using ‘paired’ rule identical to player A qq Q >> >> 66 QQ
using ‘solo’ rule qq QQ >> >> >>
larger value pair shift pair shift pair
Details refer to the direction of change seen when the value of a given parameter was increased. In the case of the non-identical simulations, the parameter value for
individual A was fixed, and that of the focal individual B was assumed to increase from a low value upwards to eventually equal that of individual A. ‘qq’ indicates a
strict increase in the statistics measured relative to the increase in the altered parameter, ‘QQ’ indicates a strict decrease, ‘<<’ indicates a strict intermediate minimum,
‘>>’ indicates a strict intermediate maximum, and ‘6’ indicates no simple pattern. Single characters (‘q’, ‘Q’, ‘<’a n d‘ >’) indicate similar trends, but with more noise in
the results explored. In comparing the effects of paired or solo foraging to identify which of these yielded the larger value, ‘pair’ means that the paired foragers had the
higher values, ‘solo’ meant the unpaired foragers had the highest values, and ‘shift’ indicates that there was a change between paired and unpaired individuals having
the higher values as the parameter itself changed. See the Methods section for information about how the comparative results from [30] are presented here.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022104.t001
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The effects of changing parameter values on the survival of non-
identical pairs had similar effects to identical pairs. There was
more predictability in the switches of individuals between being
heaviest and lightest, which tended to increase with increasing
gains or costs. The mean difference in energetic reserves between
pair members did not yield many obvious relationships, although
reducing the difference between the energetic costs of the two
Table 2. Effects of model parameters on behaviours of identical and non-identical foraging pairs.
IDENTICAL FORAGERS NON-IDENTICAL FORAGERS
direction of change in property in
response to increase in:
comparative
results
from [30]
direction of change in property in
response to increase in:
comparative
results from
[30]
gain cost gain cost
PROPERTY mean s.d. mean s.d. switchpoint gain cost mean s.d. mean s.d. switchpoint gain cost
proportion of times
player A forages
(see also Figure S5a)
using ‘paired’ rule QQ QQ qq qq qq QQ qq q 6666 qq qq
using ‘solo’ rule QQ QQ qq qq qq q << 66qq
larger value pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair
proportion of times
player B forages
(see also Figure S5b)
using ‘paired’ rule identical to player A >> << qq qq << qq qq
using ‘solo’ rule > 6 qq qq qq
larger value pair pair pair pair pair
proportion of time
players are synchronised
(see also Figure S6)
using ‘paired’ rule qq QQ << QQ QQ QQ qq < 6 qq qq >> qq qq
using ‘solo’ rule << << << << << 66qq qq <<
larger value pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair
proportion of time players
forage together
(see also Figure S7a)
using ‘paired’ rule QQ QQ qq qq >> QQ qq > 6 qq qq qq qq qq
using ‘solo’ rule QQ QQ qq qq qq > 6 qq qq qq
larger value pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair
proportion of time
players rest together
(see also Figure S7b)
using ‘paired’ rule qq qq QQ QQ QQ qq QQ << 6 Q 66 QQ QQ
using ‘solo’ rule qq qq QQ QQ QQ 66QQ QQ QQ
larger value pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair pair
proportion of time player
A forages and player B rests
(see also Figure S7c)
using ‘paired’ rule QQ qq >> qq qq Q 66 6 QQ QQ QQ qq QQ
using ‘solo’ rule >> >> >> >> >> << 6 QQ QQ QQ
larger value solo solo solo solo solo solo solo solo solo solo
proportion of time
player A rests and player B
forages (see also Figure S7d)
using ‘paired’ rule identical to previous >>qq6 Qq
using ‘solo’ rule >>qq qq qq
larger value solo solo solo solo solo
See the legend to Table 1 for full details of content.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022104.t002
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would be expected. These patterns (or lack of them) reflected the
game results in [30].
The patterns of behaviour shown by both single individuals and
by pairs yielded very few trends when energetic gains and
variation in gain were considered, which does not reflect the clear-
cut results in [30]. Increasing costs yielded much more obvious
quantifiable changes, and most of these followed the patterns given
in [30]. Changing the switchpoint values tells us little about the
behaviours expected between non-identical pair members.
Discussion
The simulations conducted here used a rule-of-thumb approx-
imation of the rules described by Rands et al. [30,32]. These
original rule-sets, calculated as optimal solutions to evolutionary
dynamic games, were more complex than the rules-of-thumb
described here, and yielded complex changes in results that were
difficult to relate to simple changes in the parameters that the
foragers were faced with [30]. Here, we demonstrate that even if
the rules of interaction between the pair members are reduced to a
much more straightforward form than that suggested by the
optimal policies of the dynamic game, the combined behaviours of
the pair are still difficult (or impossible) to predict without having
to simulate their behaviour given a particular parameter set. This
lack of obvious relationships is especially true where non-identical
pairs of foragers are considered. Some of the results shown here
agree with those given by the dynamic game model [30] – in
particular, the behavioural proportions of individuals and pairs for
both identical and non-identical pair members tended to follow
game predictions, but there was much less agreement when
considering energetic gain in non-identical individuals, or the
number of times individuals tended to switch from one behaviour
to the other.
We should expect that using two differing modelling techniques
with different assumptions is likely to yield differing results. The
original dynamic game models presented in [30,32] are based on a
few simple biologically-motivated assumptions, but it is not
possible to predict the exact form of the optimal rule sets they
generate for a given set of parameters without having to calculate
them computationally. Here, I have demonstrated that creating a
rule-of-thumb approximation of these optimal rules that would be
simpler to implement yields results that are just as difficult to relate
to the initial parameterisation of the system. Which of these two
techniques is the most biologically relevant is debatable. The
former game theoretic technique is based on a simple set of
ecologically-grounded assumptions, but yield policy sets which are
heavily reliant on recognising subtle physiological differences in
both self and foraging partner. Although the latter rule-of-thumb
simulation technique is much less reliant on an individual having
an exact knowledge of the energetic state of both itself and its
partner, but the assumptions behind the rules used are arguably
not shaped by the effects of the social and physical environment on
the fitness of individuals, but are rather guessed by the modeller as
being ‘good enough’ rules (arguably in much the same way as
many of the rule-sets that go into simulations of the collective
behaviours of individuals [31]). This suggests that using estimated
rules-of-thumb should by less justifiable if we intend to capture
biologically-appropriate behaviour within a model. However, from
a modelling perspective, rules-of-thumb are much more straight-
forward to both parameterise and implement within simulations,
and therefore the exploration of the differences between the
outputs of the two approaches conducted here is necessary to
identify where possible differences could lie.
Sumpter [38] also presents a model based on [32], exploring
social foraging by a pair of animals that can choose to forage or
rest during a given period. The model describes a cost-benefit
analysis, where foraging leads to a state-dependent increase in
fitness that is balanced by a fitness reduction due to a constant
predation cost. The severity of this cost is reduced if the pair of
individuals choose to forage at the same time. Resting is seen as a
neutral activity, which incurs no additional gains or reductions in
fitness. The model therefore frames a scenario where an
individual’s behaviour is not tempered by a possible risk of
starvation, and also where predation doesn’t lead to a potential
cataclysmic reduction in future fitness to zero (which could occur if
the individual was eaten). Despite these major differences,
Sumpter’s model gives a similar strategy to the rule-of-thumb
suggested in [30,32] that is implemented in results described in the
current paper, which could justify tying the purely mechanistic
rule-of-thumb with a more solid functional grounding. Sumpter
also extends this single-decision framework to consider a co-
ordination game where resting does incur a cost, and where there
is some stochasticity in metabolic expenditure. Stochasticity
appears to be implemented in a different manner to that used
here and in [30,32], which may explain why pairs of individuals
within a pair in [38] are never able to switch in role from being the
heavier to the lighter individual. Therefore, in Sumpter’s model,
the nutritional state of the members of a pair will not be a
consequence of synchronisation, whilst (contrary to Sumpter’s
discussion), in the dynamic games of Rands et al. [30,32],
synchronisation is a direct result of the assumptions made about
how changes in energetic state are related to fitness.
What I demonstrate in this manuscript is a lack of agreement
between two modelling techniques (the dynamic games presented
in [30,32], and the rule-of-thumb simulations presented here),
which suggests that the rules-of-thumb extracted from the
dynamic games may not be catching some of the subtler
behavioural interactions between the pair members that are
specified by the games’ more detailed behavioural policies.
However, there is agreement for some of the parameters, which
in turn suggests that the simplified rules aren’t necessarily
inappropriate. Care therefore needs to be taken in translating
the subtler details of the dynamic game policies to a format that is
computationally simple enough to be implemented usefully
within a simulation involving multiple independent agents: it
makes more sense to use rules based on some biological reality
rather than rules that are based purely on guesswork [31]. It is
therefore important to conduct investigations such as those
presented here, to allow us to understand the limitations of both
techniques. As Hutchinson & Gigerenzer [39] explicitly state,
optimality modelling provides us with clues for what heuristics
might be being used within natural systems, and conducting
comparative tests such as those given here give us a handle on
what could work and what might not.
The simulations presented here only consider a pair of foragers,
but it is reassuring that the predictions coming from both the
current simulations and the dynamic game model give broadly
similar trends in response to the energetic parameters put into
them. It is computationally difficult to extend state-dependent
game theoretic modelling to larger groups (especially if individuals
are not identical), and having some validation of these simpler
rules gives some support to the generalised multi-agent simulations
conducted by Rands et al. [33,34]. There are still many variations
on this foraging rule-set to consider theoretically, such as using
them to explore how group behaviour affects predation risk (e.g.
[40–46]), or to consider the effects of non-egalitarian decision-
making within the group (e.g. [23,34,47,48]). Being able to build on
Approximating with Rules-of-Thumb
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based rules could developed from a functional perspective.
It should also be noted that optimal behaviour as predicted by
the dynamic game models may not be biologically valid due to
developmental and other constraints. By considering simple
approximations of these rules, we are instead considering ‘best
attempts’ at good behaviours that could be feasibly selected for in
an organism that faces biological constraints in its development.
McNamara & Houston [49] argue that we need to pay more
attention to how behavioural systems are built to deal with these
constraints, as the mechanisms generating these behaviours may
not be flexible enough to allow the optimal behaviour to be
performed. This would give a finite number of possible sets of
behaviours, which an organism would have to use when
responding to the environment. Rules that have been generated
by natural selection may work very badly [50], whilst some rules
that work very well may make little sense [51]. Considering both
function and possible mechanistic constraints when creating a
model is an important step towards understanding the design of
decision-making systems (see, for example, [52–56]). Characteris-
ing the limitations and differences between both, using techniques
such as those described here, is an important step towards this
understanding.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Proportions of the population surviving 2,500
timesteps, in response to the manipulation of target
parameters. The left column illustrates the cases where pair
members are identical in all their parameters, and the right hand
column illustrates the case where the target parameter of
individual B is manipulated whilst that of individual A is held
constant. From top to bottom, the figures illustrate what happens
when the target parameter being manipulated is: the mean
energetic gain; the standard deviation of the energetic gain; the
mean energetic loss during a timestep; the standard deviation of
the energetic loss; and the behavioural switchpoint determining
the behaviour shown by an individual dependent upon its
energetic reserves. The black line represents the mean proportion
alive (6 s.d., given as black error bars) when individuals in a pair
followed a ‘paired’ rule; the red line represents the mean
proportion alive (6 s.d., given as orange error bars) when
individuals in a pair followed a ‘solo’ rule. Paired and solo lines are
displayed slightly offset for clarity. These results are summarised in
Table 1.
(PDF)
Figure S2 Ro ˆle switches in response to the manipula-
tion of target parameters. Figures display the mean number
of timesteps (6 s.d.) that individuals switched in their ‘ro ˆle’
between being the heavier and the lighter member of the pair.
Layout is as described for Figure S1. These results are summarised
in Table 1.
(PDF)
Figure S3 Mean differences in a pair’s energy reserves,
in response to the manipulation of target parameters.
Figures display the mean energetic difference (6 s.d.) within a pair
during a timestep. Layout is as described for Figure S1. These
results are summarised in Table 1.
(PDF)
Figure S4 Changes in individual behavioural switches
in response to the manipulation of target parameters.
Figures show: a) mean number of behavioural switches (6 s.d.)
shown by a focal individual (when foragers are identical) or
individual A (when foragers are non-identical); b) mean number of
behavioural switches (6 s.d.) shown by individual B (when foragers
are non-identical). Layout is as described for Figure S1. These
results are summarised in Table 1.
(PDF)
Figure S5 Changes in individual foraging behaviour in
response to the manipulation of target parameters.
Figures show: a) mean number of timesteps (6 s.d.) where foraging
behaviour was conducted by a focal individual (when foragers are
identical) or individual A (when foragers are non-identical); b)
mean number of timesteps (6 s.d.) where foraging behaviour was
conducted by individual B (when foragers are non-identical).
Layout is as described for Figure S1. These results are summarised
in Table 2.
(PDF)
Figure S6 Synchronisation behaviour in response to the
manipulation of target parameters. Figures show: a) mean
number of timesteps (6 s.d.) where both individuals in a pair were
conducting the same behaviour. Layout is as described for Figure
S1. These results are summarised in Table 2.
(PDF)
Figure S7 Changes in pair behaviour in response to the
manipulation of target parameters. Figures show: a) mean
number of timesteps (6 s.d.) where both members of a pair
foraged; b) mean number of timesteps (6 s.d.) where both
members of a pair rested; c) mean number of timesteps (6 s.d.)
where pair members conducted differing behaviours (when
foragers were identical) or where individual A foraged and
individual B rested (when foragers are non-identical); d) mean
number of timesteps where individual A rested and individual B
foraged (when foragers were non-identical). Layout is as described
for Figure S1. These results are summarised in Table 2.
(PDF)
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